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Abstract 
A main activity of the state is to redistribute resources. Models of the political process 
generally predict that a rise in inequality will lead to more redistribution. This paper shows 
that, for the UK in the period 1983-2004, a plausibly exogenous rise in income inequality has 
not been associated with increased redistribution. We then explore this further using 
attitudinal data. We show that the demand for redistribution, having shown considerable 
variation over time, is at an all-time low. We argue that the decline in the demand for 
redistribution can mostly be accounted for by an increasing belief in the importance of 
incentives though changes in preferences over the distribution of income have been important 
in some sub-periods. 
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 1 
Equation Section 1 
"I warn you that there are going to be howls of anguish from those rich enough to pay 
over 75% on their last slice of earnings", a gleeful Denis Healey, Labour Party Shadow 
Chancellor, 1973. 
 
"The justice for me is concentrated on lifting incomes of those that don't have a decent 
income. It's not my burning ambition to make sure that David Beckham earns less 
money", Tony Blair, Labour Party Leader, 2001 Election Campaign. 
 
Introduction 
One of the main activities of the state is to redistribute resources.  This redistribution can 
take many forms, being explicit through the tax and welfare system, less direct through 
the subsidized public provision of certain services (notably education and health) and 
even indirectly through various government regulations (e.g. the minimum wage).  
Economists have, understandably, been interested in the determinants of the variability in 
the amount of redistribution both across countries and over time.  The starting point for 
this inquiry is most commonly some model of the political process (originating with 
Romer, 1975, Roberts, 1977, Meltzer and Richard, 1981 – see Persson and Tabellini, 
2002, ch. 6, for a more recent overview).  These models tend to have the prediction that, 
ceteris paribus, an increase in inequality should bring about an increase in redistribution.  
For example, in the model of Meltzer and Richard (1981), where the median voter is 
decisive, the amount of redistribution is determined by the ratio of mean to median 
income.  It is probably possible to construct models in which this prediction does not hold 
but it is widely regarded as a ‘best guess’1.  Unfortunately, the prediction that more 
inequality leads to more redistribution has not fared particularly well empirically (see, for 
example Perotti (1996), and Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 2003) though Finseraas 
                                                 
1
 For example, Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 2003) argue that an important distinction should be made 
between the redistributive and insurance aspects of the welfare states, arguing that more inequality reduces 
the demand for insurance. 
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(2006) does claim some support when comparing European countries).  One stark 
example of this ‘paradox of redistribution’ comes from a simple comparison of the 
United States and Europe where Europe has lower pre-tax inequality and more 
redistribution (see Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001). 
 However, as noted by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), the empirical studies that 
use cross-country data are not based on a high-quality research design.  There are many 
other differences between countries that muddy the link between income inequality and 
redistribution.  While the existing studies do make serious attempts to control for these 
confounding factors it is very difficult to do this in a way that is beyond reasonable 
criticism.  Studies of the variability in redistribution have tended to emphasize the 
importance of factors like racial divisions (e.g. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001) and 
the political system (e.g. Austen-Smith, 2000, Iversen and Soskice, 2006).  What does not 
seem to be in the existing literature is a study of how, for a given country, redistribution 
responds to changes in income inequality.  Looking at a country over time has the 
potential advantage that many factors that might be thought to be relevant to 
redistribution (e.g. the political system) are held constant so we might hope to get a better 
estimate of the impact of inequality on redistribution. That is the purpose of this paper 
where we consider the case of the UK.   
The UK is a good country to consider because it has had large rises in pre-tax 
income inequality that are generally thought to be the result of the exogenous forces of 
technological change and globalization (Machin, 2003) or changes in the supply of skills 
(Card and Lemieux, 2001).  In particular there has been a large rise in the share of pre-tax 
income going to those at the top of the income distribution (see Atkinson, 2003, for the 
 3 
evolution of the income share of the top 1% over 100 years).  As discussed above, most 
models of the political process would predict that the political response to this would take 
the form of rising redistribution with rising marginal tax rates on the rich.  But there is a 
strong suspicion that this has not happened.  For example, the top rate of income tax fell 
from 83% in the late 1970s to 40% in 1988 since when it has not changed.   
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we document some basic 
facts about the changing distribution of pre- and post-tax income in the UK over the past 
30 years.  The second section then uses a simple model of the choice of the tax system to 
argue that the observed outcomes cannot easily be rationalised using a model with 
unchanging fundamentals (preferences and beliefs) so that something must have 
changed2.   
 The third, fourth and fifth sections then explore what might have changed using 
attitudinal data from the British Social Attitudes Survey for the period 1983-2004.  We 
show that the demand for redistribution rose in the period 1983-1995 when income 
inequality was rising fastest, but the demand for redistribution has fallen since 1995 to its 
lowest-recorded levels even though there has been no dramatic fall in income inequality 
over this period.  The fourth section shows that political economy models do have some 
ability to explain the variation in the demand for redistribution – for example, income, 
views over the desired distribution of income and views about the importance of 
                                                 
2
 This conclusion is in line with the casual empiricism based on the stated policies towards redistribution of 
the major political parties as summarized by the quotes at the beginning of the paper.  In the 1970s the top 
marginal rate of income tax was 98% on unearned and 83% on earned income.  The Thatcher government 
reduced the top marginal rate of tax to 40% and Tony Blair has explicitly resisted pressure from some parts 
of the Labour party to raise it  The Liberal Democrats fought the 2005 general election promising to raise 
the rate to 50% but their 2006 Conference removed this long-standing pledge.  Raising tax rates on the rich 
is currently off the political agenda, something that seems very curious given the large rise in their share of 
pre-tax income inequality. 
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incentives all have significant effects.  Finally the fifth section uses Oaxaca 
decompositions to explain the falling demand for redistribution.  We also find that 
changes in these variables can explain 75% of the fall in the demand for redistribution 
over the period from the mid 1980s to the mid 2000s with an increasing belief in the 
importance of incentives being the most important factor.  
 
1. Inequality and Redistribution in the UK 
In this section we briefly describe the evolution of inequality in both pre- and post-tax 
income in the UK over the last 30 years.  The UK tax and benefit system has a vast 
number of different programmes that take from one group and give to another – we will 
not seek to document them all here.  Rather we will simply focus on one measure of the 
overall amount of redistribution taken from the reported figures on the “The effects of 
taxes and benefits on household income” that has been produced by the Office for 
National Statistics on a more or less comparable basis since 1971 (and earlier on a less 
comparable basis) – see Jones (2006) for the most recent version of this analysis.  This 
divides households into deciles and then reports levels of original income and various 
other measures of income including final income that includes imputed estimates of the 
value of benefits derived from public services (most importantly, health and education)3. 
 The ONS produces different statistics based on different groupings of households 
into deciles.  For the whole period 1971-2005, there are figures based on ordering 
households by disposable income i.e. unequivalised and after taxes.  This ordering is not 
                                                 
3
  This is important as, for example, an important aspect of redistribution in the UK is the National Health 
Service which provides free health care to all.  If the share of GDP spent on healthcare rises over time and 
taxes are raised to pay for it, the UK welfare state will be becoming more redistributive even if the income 
tax system is not becoming more progressive. 
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the ideal one for our purpose as we would prefer some measure of equivalised original 
income.  For some years there are also figures for orderings of households on other 
bases4.  None of this matters if the tax and benefit system left the ordering of households 
in terms of income unchanged but there are ways in which it doesn’t (e.g. many 
pensioners have zero original income but are higher up the income distribution in terms 
of disposable income).  But, in practice these difficulties seem to make little difference to 
an assessment of the trends in redistribution and the results we report here are based on 
the longest available run of consistent data. 
 Figure 1 shows the trends in the cumulative shares of original income (i.e. before 
redistribution) from 1971-2005.  One can clearly see the marked decline in the share 
going to the bottom 80% of households in the period from the late 1970s to the early 
1990s since when it has been stable.  This obviously implies a rise in the share of original 
income for the top 20% of households.  The fall in the income share for the bottom 80% 
is in all parts of the distribution, indeed it is largest for those in the middle (where one 
might expect the median voter to be located) as the income share of the bottom 20% 
hardly changes.  This is the rise in pre-tax income inequality. 
 Now consider what happens post-tax.  Here Figure 2 reports shares in final 
income after all redistribution through taxes and benefits, both in cash and in kind.  The 
changes here are more muted because the tax and benefit system does redistribute income 
but the pattern is the same – a rising share in final income of the top 20% with the most 
marked falls in the middle of the distribution. 
                                                 
4
 Since 1987 there are tables ordering households by equivalised disposable income and prior to that tables 
ordering households by (unequivalised) original income. 
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 Although Figures 1 and 2 do show that not all of the rise in pre-tax income 
inequality has been undone by the tax and benefit system and there has been a rise in 
post-tax income inequality, it is not quite so simple to say whether redistribution has gone 
up or down more than would be predicted by the political economy models, as the simple 
theories do not predict that all rises in wage inequality should be undone by the tax 
system as long as there are any incentive effects at work.  One might point to the fall in 
the top marginal rate of income tax from 83% to 40% as evidence of declining 
progressivity at the top of the distribution but very few people paid the 83% rate and the 
failure to index tax thresholds to average earnings has caused more people to pay the 
40% rate than previously (see Adam et al, 2007).   Adam et al (2007) also point out that 
the difference between the pre- and post-tax Gini coefficient has remained very stable 
and argue that this must mean lower progressivity as the rise in pre-tax wage inequality 
would otherwise have caused a rise in the Gini gap.  Here, we take a different approach – 
we use a simple theory of the determination of tax rates to attempt to infer whether what 
we observe is consistent with a constant underlying political process – this is the subject 
of the next section.   
 
2. A Simple Model of the Choice of the Tax System 
In this section we describe an approach that allows us to infer whether the observed 
changes in pre- and post-tax income can be interpreted as the outcome in which only 
inequality is changing but the ‘fundamentals’ are constant.  Our approach has many 
affinities to the optimal income tax literature that started with Mirrlees (1971) but differs 
in the details from the standard way of setting up these problems.  It is perhaps most 
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similar to Bourguignon and Spadaro (2005) in its attempt to back out implicit social 
weights from observed redistribution. 
 
Preferences and Labour Supply 
Assume that the individual utility function can be written as: 
 ( )logU C Hθ= −  (1) 
This specification of the utility function imposes the restriction that the uncompensated 
labour supply elasticity is zero5.  Assume that the only difference between people is in 
their pre-tax hourly wage, W.  Denote by ( )W f  the hourly wage of someone at position 
f in the income distribution – call them an f-worker.   
If the tax-benefit system is such that the tax paid on income Y is T(Y), an f-
worker will choose H to maximize:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )max logHU f W f H T W f H Hθ = − −   (2) 
leading to the first-order condition:  
 
[ ]
( ) ( )
1 '
' 0
W T
H
WH T WH
θ− − =
−
 (3) 
which can be written as:  
 ( ) [ ]( )
1 '
'
1
T
H H
T WH
WH
θ −=
−
 (4) 
The right-hand side of (4) is 1 minus the marginal tax rate divided by 1 minus the average 
tax rate, the coefficient of residual income progression (CRIP), a well-known measure of 
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 The more common assumption in the optimal income tax literature is ‘no income effects’ but the 
specification here is more appealing for it predicts that, as hourly wages rise, there is no marked secular 
trend in hours worked whereas ‘no income effects’ predicts an upward trend.  
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the progressivity of a tax system (see e.g. Musgrave and Musgrave, 1976).  It is the 
percentage increase in post-tax income from a 1% increase in pre-tax income.  For future 
use let us denote the CRIP as V – it will, in general depend on the tax system, hours of 
work and earnings but let us denote by V(f) the CRIP faced by an individual at position f.  
(4) gives us: 
 ( ) ( )( )H f V fψ=  (5) 
Where ψ  is an increasing function so that the CRIP is a sufficient statistic for the level of 
hours supplied by an individual.  Denote by ( )Vε  the elasticity of hours of work with 
respect to the CRIP.  In what follows we will assume that all individuals have non-zero 
hours of work, something that is appropriate for our focus on the top part of the income 
distribution.  If those at the bottom of the wage distribution do not work, some of the 
formulae that follow would need modification. 
The envelope condition from (2) now implies that: 
 ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )
' 1 '
' '
HW T
U f V f w f
WH T WH
−
= =
−
 (6) 
Where lower-case letters denote logs. 
 
The Determination of the Tax System 
Now consider how the tax system is determined.  We will not model the political process 
directly – rather we will assume that a person at position f in the income distribution has 
some weight g(f) – what we will call the social weight - on the outcome so that the tax 
system is chosen to maximize: 
 ( ) ( )g f U f dfΩ =    (7) 
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If the median voter was decisive only ( )0.5g  would be non-zero but models of 
probabilistic voting (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2002) or social preferences suggest 
that others will have non-zero influence.  Note that the specification used assumes that 
the weight on the outcome depends only on the position in the distribution and not on 
either pre- or post-tax income.  For future use denote by ( )G f  the cumulative density 
function of the social weights.    
 The tax system will be chosen to maximize (7) subject to a budget constraint.  We 
will assume, for the moment, that all tax revenue is given back to individuals rather than 
the more common formulation where the government has a revenue constraint because 
that is the nature of the data we used in the previous section (where a monetary value is 
attached to the consumption of public services).  So, the budget constraint we use can be 
written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )C f df W f H f df Y= =   (8) 
The constraint, first pointed out by Mirrlees (1971), that marginal tax rates can be 
restricted, without loss of generality, to be less than or equal to 1 here translates into the 
constraint that ( ) 0V f ≥ .  But, assuming we have an interior solution the following 
Proposition derives a formula for the marginal tax rate ( )m f : 
 
 
Proposition 1: Assuming an interior solution, the optimal tax system can be written as:  
 
( )
( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
'
1 '
C
C
G f S fm f w f
m f S fV fε
−    
= 
− 
  (9) 
 10 
where ( )CS f  is the share of total consumption going to those at position f or below. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
The formula for tax rates derived in (9) has clear affinities to those first derived by 
Mirrlees (1971) and recently revived by Piketty (1997) and Saez (2001).  What is slightly 
different is that everything is expressed in terms of the tax rate at a given position in the 
income distribution rather than for a given level of income – this is helpful for our 
purposes as we are interested in what happens to tax rates for the top of the distribution as 
their incomes rise.  In this set-up as in the rest of the literature, it is impossible to provide 
explicit closed-form solutions to the optimal tax problem so that the right-hand side of (9) 
depends on the tax system.  But one can readily derive from (9) the standard result that 
marginal tax rates should be zero at top and bottom as ( ) ( )CG f S f=  at the two 
extremes. 
 One special case where a closed-form expression is available is where there are 
no disincentive effects on labour supply so that ε =0.  In this case the optimal distribution 
of post-tax income has ( ) ( )cS f G f=  (assuming an interior solution) so that one could 
think of G(f) as representing the optimal distribution of consumption.  In this case the 
post-tax distribution of income is completely independent of the pre-tax distribution so 
one would expect an increase in pre-tax inequality to be completely undone by the tax 
system.  (9) also suggests that marginal tax rates should be lower the more elastic is 
labour supply. 
 When there is some disincentive effect one would no longer expect increases in 
pre-tax inequality to be completely undone by the tax system as one wants those with 
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higher incomes to work more (as this raises national income) and this requires a decline 
in the progressivity of the tax system.  But (9) can be thought of as saying that marginal 
tax rates should rise if wage inequality rises as this corresponds to a higher ( )'w f  and, 
for no change in the tax system, a lower ( )CS f  for 0<f<1. 
 We now try to see whether the observed outcomes on the distribution of pre- and 
post-tax incomes can be rationalized as an outcome of the political process as outlined 
above with constant ‘fundamentals’ (the social weights and labour supply elasticities).  
 Re-arranging the expression for the optimal tax rate in (9) leads to: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
'
' 1
C
C
S f m f
S f G f
w f m fε
 
= −  
− 
  (10) 
The terms involving ( ) ( ) ( ), ' ,CS f w f m f  are all computable from the observed data of 
the previous section (Appendix B describes the exact way in which we do that).  But the 
‘fundamentals’ ( )G f  and ε  are unknowns.  However if (10) is satisfied with constant 
fundamentals it must be the case that the left-hand side (the share of final income) moves 
inversely with the term in observables on the right-hand side (we will call this the 
incentive term).  
One would not necessarily expect there to be a negative relationship between the 
share of final income and the incentive term every year as there is quite likely to be a 
disequilibrium in any particular year – the first-past-the-post electoral system means that 
Britain is, in the periods between elections, an elective dictatorship with the government 
facing review in elections every 5 years. So there is considerable scope in the short-run 
for a deviation of people’s preferences from the actions of government.  But, in the 
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longer-run one would expect a closer alignment so a negative relationship should be 
visible over a longer time period. 
Figure 3 shows that this has not been the case.  This plots the share in final 
income against the estimated incentive term (based on the estimation procedure described 
in Appendix B) for the sixth through ninth deciles.  For all of them, there is a similar 
picture – the long-run trend is for a positive relationship between the share of final 
income and the incentive effect, an indication that the rise in inequality has not been met 
by an increase in redistribution6.  The 1980s is the period crucial for this positive 
correlation (and excluding them makes it disappear).  However, this is plausible – pre-tax 
income inequality rose fastest in the 1980s (see Figure 1) and the Thatcher government 
did not respond by redistributing more.   
The model used here is, of course, very special, reducing all the many dimensions 
of the tax/benefit system to one.  But the analysis does strongly suggest that the 
fundamentals in the economy have changed.  We now turn to more direct evidence for 
these changes. 
 
 
 
3. Empirical Evidence on the Demand for Redistribution: Data 
 To look at evidence on the demand for redistribution we turn to data from the 
British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) and British Election Studies (BES).  The BSAS 
                                                 
6
 Our conclusion here differs from that Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) who use data from the 
Luxembourg Income Study to argue using Gini coefficients that increased inequality has been associated 
with increased redistribution in the UK and other countries.  However, if we use ONS data on UK Gini 
coefficients, one cannot reproduce this finding so it may be an artifact of the data used. 
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has been conducted every year since 1983, except for the years 1987 and 1992, with the 
BES being conducted in each election year.  The BES has various antecedents that go 
back into the 1960s though the earliest surveys are not much use for our purposes as the 
questions asked are rarely asked in more recent years.  The BSAS/BES asks questions on 
a wide range of social and political attitudes though the questions asked vary from year to 
year and even across sub-samples in the same year.  Some questions are asked every year 
or almost every year, some questions occasionally and some in only one survey.  Because 
we are primarily interested in changes over time, we focus most of our attention on the 
questions asked reasonably regularly but use the more infrequent questions where they 
are particularly relevant to our investigations. 
 The question asked in many years of the BSAS/BES that relates most closely to 
the role that the government should play in redistribution is the question: 
 
REDISTRIBUTE: “government should redistribute from the better-off to those that are 
less well-off” (1=strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree)   
 
In what follows we will use the answers to this question as our measure of the 
demand for redistribution.  Although the responses to this question might be expected to 
give some indication of the demand for redistribution, there are a number of possible 
interpretations of the answers, not all of which would support its use as a measure of the 
demand for redistribution.  For example, it might be that some respondents think there 
should be some redistribution so agree with the statement but think that redistribution has 
gone too far and would like less in the current situation.  Perhaps the question one would 
like to have been asked would be ‘government should do more to redistribute from the 
better-off to those that are less well-off’.   
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 Although we do not have the answers to that specific question for all years, there 
are occasional questions asked about whether more should be done to redistribute.  For 
example in 1987, 1992, and 1997, a question about the view on the current level of 
redistribution was asked where respondents were asked to place themselves on an 11-
point scale where 1 was the belief that government should make much greater efforts to 
make people’s incomes equal and 11 was the belief that the government should be much 
less concerned about how equal people’s incomes are.  This correlates closely with the 
REDISTRIBUTE variable suggesting that those who think there should be redistribution 
also think there should be more efforts to redistribute.  Table 1 shows the average value 
of the response to the ‘more effort’ question for each response to REDISTRIBUTE 
showing a very strong correlation.  In a regression of REDISTRIBUTE on the other 
question, the t-statistic is 59.  
Figure 4 presents the time-series for the mean responses to REDISTRIBUTE.  In 
the late 1970s the demand for redistribution was at its highest, then falling until the mid 
1980s.  The demand for redistribution then rose until the mid-1990s when it began to fall 
again.  The demand for redistribution is currently at its lowest level even though the level 
of inequality is at or close to its highest level as we have seen in Figures 1 and 2. We 
would offer the following narrative to explain this pattern as compared to the actual 
evolution of inequality documented in the previous section.  The economic failures of the 
1970s led to disillusion with the policies of the Labour Party (including its egalitarian 
inclinations) and the election of Margaret Thatcher.  The 1980s and early 1990s were a 
period of starkly rising inequality in both pre- and post-tax incomes.  This was the period 
in which the tax system did not respond to the rise in inequality as we have seen from the 
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analysis in the previous section.  But the redistributive policies of the Thatcher 
government were never particularly popular and there was rising dissatisfaction with the 
rise in inequality as evidenced by a rising demand for redistribution.  The Conservative 
government remained in power because its policies in other dimensions were deemed 
better, notably its management of the economy.  But, after a narrow election victory in 
1992, and the ejection from the exchange rate mechanism in 1993, the government was 
extremely unpopular and would have a lost an election at any time.  So, by the time of the 
Blair landslide in 1997 it is plausible to think there was a gap between the demand for 
redistribution and the actual amount in the economy.  One might have predicted the Blair 
government to have been strongly redistributive.  But, in fact, little happened7 – both pre- 
and post-tax inequality were quite stable in this period.  If the demand for redistribution 
was unchanged this would suggest a continuing unmet demand for redistribution.  But 
Figure 4 shows that the demand for redistribution was falling.  It is this fall in the demand 
for redistribution in recent years in the face of relative stability in the income distribution 
that will be the main focus of the remaining part of this paper.  This fall in the demand for 
redistribution seems to have occurred at all income levels – Figure 5 shows the trend for 
different quartiles of equivalised household income – as one would expect, the rich have 
a lower demand for redistribution in a given year but one can see the decline in the 
demand for redistribution among all income groups. 
 Our aim is to explain the time-series behaviour of the redistribution variable.  Our 
empirical strategy is to think about the factors likely to be able to explain the attitude 
towards redistribution using the theoretical framework sketched above, then to see 
whether these factors can explain the cross-section variation in the demand for 
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 The redistribution that did take place focused heavily on children and pensioners. 
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redistribution and then to see whether time-series variation in these variables can explain 
the trend in the demand for redistribution.  If all relevant questions were asked in all 
years of BSAS this investigation would be very straightforward but unfortunately they 
are not so it is a bit messier.  This explains why, for example, one cannot simply include 
all variables of potential interest in a single regression and why the sample sizes in the 
regressions reported below vary from one case to the next. 
 Using the theoretical framework in the earlier section we might think that the 
demand for redistribution would be a function of the social weights (the g(f) function) 
and views about the importance of incentives ().  In addition we also consider the role 
played by perceptions of the level of pre-tax wage inequality and trust in the political 
process to deliver what voters want.  Our explanation for the fall in the demand for 
redistribution will focus on these factors. 
 
Social Weights 
‘Social weights’ here should be interpreted very broadly to mean any factor that affects 
the g(f) function, the weight in the social welfare function attached to the utility of people 
at various points in the income distribution.  We would expect this to be affected by the 
preferences of individuals over outcomes and their weight in the political process.   
 The simplest economic models assume that individuals only care about the 
outcomes that affect their current selves so that the current position in the income 
distribution affects the demand for redistribution – we will capture this by log income 
relative to the median.  Because measures of current income are quite likely to have a lot 
of noise in them we also include occupation and education as measures of permanent 
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income.  Some other work (e.g. Luttmer, 2001; Vigdor, 2006) has suggested that it is how 
one is doing relative to people in one’s own neighbourhood (and not the national level as 
our specification assumes) that is most important in influencing views on redistribution – 
we are not really able to test this view because BSAS only has regional information at the 
level of 11 broad regions. 
 But, people’s position in the income distribution is not constant.  The future 
position in the income distribution might be unpredictable leading to a demand for social 
insurance which means weight is put on people at other points in the income distribution 
other than one’s current position.  The more important luck is felt to be in determining 
success or the more risk-averse one is the more redistribution one might expect. Other 
work (e.g. Fong, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) has shown how the attitude to 
redistribution is influenced by beliefs about whether success is the result of luck or hard 
work and Cusack et al (2006) find that the demand for redistribution is related to 
exposure to labour market risk.  Unfortunately BSAS does not contain any question 
related to this.   
Or, the future position in the income distribution might be predictable.  The 
prospect of upward mobility would mean individuals put some weight on outcomes in 
parts of income distribution where they expect to be in the future (Benabou and Ok, 
2001).  Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) use predicted income mobility from panel data and 
find higher future income growth is useful in predicting attitudes to redistribution in the 
US.  We do not take this approach as, in the absence of micro data on actual mobility, the 
identification strategy depends on excluding some variables that influence income growth 
from the redistribution equation, which might be questionable.  But, in our data we might 
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expect the young to be less in favour of redistribution than the old with a given level of 
current income as the young can expect their income to grow in the future. 
Or, it may be that people really do care about the utility of others.  This might be 
positively in the sense of altruism or negatively in the sense of status rivalry (see, for 
example, Corneo and Gruner, 2002).  Suppose that each individual has a utility function: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
0
u f u f u x x dxβ pi= +   (11) 
Where u(x) is their utility as defined previously and where  measures the weight put on 
the utility of others.  ( )xpi  represents the weight on the utility of someone at position x – 
it will be positive if one cares about them but could be negative if one is envious of them.  
In this case the social welfare function that is effectively being maximized is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
0 0
u f g f df u f g f f dfβpi= +       (12) 
Where ( )g f  is the weight in the political process.  Using (11) and (12) the effective 
weights are:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1
G f f
G f ββ
+ Π
=
+

 (13) 
More weight will be put on the lower part of the distribution if people are less selfish and 
more weight on the top part if people are less envious – Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 
(2001) make this point.  It is important to note that the effects of more selfishness and 
less envy are, in some ways, symmetric in terms of their predictions about what will 
happen to redistribution.  To capture these ideas about social preferences we include 
variables which measure whether people agree with the statements that  
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CLASSCONFLICT1 “big business benefits owners at the expense of workers” (1 
strongly disagree….5 strongly agree) 
 
CLASSCONFLICT2 “there is one law for the rich and one for the poor” (1 strongly 
disagree….5 strongly agree) 
 
on the grounds that these seem to reflect views that the pre-tax distribution of income is 
not legitimate so agreement with these statements might be expected to be associated 
with a greater demand for redistribution.  Because these ideas are associated with the 
trade union movement we also control for trade union membership, TUNION.   
 Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) also argue that interpersonal altruism 
seems linked to race.  In the UK, as in many countries, ethnic minorities tend to have 
lower incomes so are favoured by redistribution.  If this is the case we might expect those 
who express racial prejudice to be more opposed to redistribution.  To capture this idea 
we include the following self-assessed measure of racial prejudice: 
 
RACIALPREJUDICE “Would you describe yourself as: 3: very prejudiced against 
people of other races, 2: a little prejudiced, 1: not prejudiced at all” 
 
There are also some questions in BSAS/BES that might be interpreted as being directly 
about preferences over the distribution of income as they do not refer to inequality 
without making explicit reference to whether the government should do anything about it:  
 
PREFERENCES1 “The gap between rich and poor is 1: too large, 0: about right/too 
small.” 
 
PREFERENCES2 “Ordinary working people do not get their fair share over the nation’s 
wealth” (1 strongly disagree….5 strongly agree) 
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These questions relate to views about the legitimacy and fairness of the income 
distribution.  However, there are a number of possible ways to interpret these responses, 
not all of which are consistent with their use as a measure of pure preferences.  The 
answers might be about their comparison of the current income distribution with their 
ideal income distribution in a world with no disincentives or untrustworthy politicians – 
in this case one might interpret it as being primarily about preferences.  Or it could be 
answered as being about the ideal income distribution in a world with disincentives in 
which case one might interpret it as being about whether there should be more or less 
redistribution from the current situation.  In the latter case, the variables might not be 
very different from the dependent variable.  In favour of the ‘pure preference’ view it 
should be said that very large majorities think the gap between rich and poor is too large 
(see Bromley, 2003, for a more extensive analysis of this variable) making it problematic 
to interpret this question as being about whether there should be more or less 
redistribution as there would then seem to be a very large excess demand for 
redistribution.  However because of the ambiguity in the interpretation of these questions 
we report specifications with and without these variables. 
We also include a variable NORELIGION according to whether individuals do 
not have a religion (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006, provide an argument for why the 
religious are less in favour of redistribution).  Non-christians are too few in number to 
allow more disaggregation than this. 
Finally, one might expect that the weight in the social objective function is 
influenced by the propensity to vote.  It is well-known that turnout in UK general 
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elections has fallen and if this fall in turn-out is not randomly distributed this can affect 
the demand for redistribution among voters.  In practice this does not seem very 
important – Figure 6 shows the change in demand for redistribution among voters and 
non-voters.  Voters are marginally les likely to favour redistribution but the trends are 
very similar.  We do not pursue this argument further as we have always found it to have 
little explanatory power. 
Perhaps more tricky is to evaluate the argument that money has been becoming 
more influential in politics so that we have moved away from ‘one person one vote’ 
towards ‘one pound one vote’.  Those who argue for this tend to suggest that money 
influences preference through the actions of the media.  Unfortunately, BSAS has limited 
information on media use, the only question regularly asked is whether the respondent 
reads a newspaper with, in occasional years, questions on the number of hours of TV 
watched.  We found these, admittedly limited, variables to be of little use in explaining 
attitudes to redistribution so do not pursue this line of enquiry further. 
 
 
Perceptions of Inequality 
 The model used in the theoretical section assumed that everyone knows the true 
distribution of post-tax income.  But, in practice there is poor information.  In particular, 
there is evidence that the extent of wage inequality at the top is much greater than 
perceived – see Hills (2004).  This can explain why we see less redistribution than might 
be expected but in order to explain changes over time one needs the degree of 
misperception to change. 
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In 1987 and 1999 (but unfortunately, only those years) respondents are asked 
about what they think the actual pay is and should be of certain groups of workers – the 
occupations asked about in both years are skilled factory workers, unskilled factory 
workers, doctors, chairman of a big corporation and a cabinet minister.  There is 
considerable heterogeneity in the answers to the questions about what actual pay is, 
revealing considerable misperceptions of the true pay distribution.  As measures of 
perceived actual pay differentials we use the following: 
 
ACTPAYDIFF1 “log of actual pay of unskilled factory worker relative to skilled factory 
worker” 
 
ACTPAYDIFF2 “log of actual pay of chairman of big corporation relative to skilled 
factory worker” 
 
ACTPAYDIFF3 “log of actual pay of doctor relative to skilled factory worker” 
 
ACTPAYDIFF4 “log of actual pay of cabinet minister relative to skilled factory worker” 
 
where we use the perceived earnings relative to a skilled factory worker as they have 
close to average earnings.  We also define the variables SHDPAYDIFFx to represent the 
actual pay differential the respondent believes there should be.  As documented by Hills 
(2004) the responses to these questions do show a demand for redistribution as the 
desired pay differentials are smaller than the actual (subject to the proviso that doctors are 
generally thought particularly deserving of high salaries and cabinet ministers less 
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deserving).  But this data also show widespread variation in the perceptions of the actual 
degree of pay inequality. 
 
Incentives 
The elasticity of the labour supply curve is important in determining the optimal degree 
of redistribution.  We often assume people know the ‘right’ model but academic 
economists debate the size of disincentive effects (see, for example, the contrasting views 
of Feldstein, 1995, and Gruber and Saez, 2002) so we should not be that surprised if this 
was mirrored in the electorate.  To capture this possibility we use the following 
questions: 
 
INCENTIVES1 “the welfare state makes people nowadays less willing to look after 
themselves” (1: strongly disagree,…, 5: strongly agree) 
 
INCENTIVES2 “if welfare benefits weren’t so generous people would learn to stand on 
their own feet” (1: strongly disagree,…,5: strongly agree) 
 
INCENTIVES3 “Around here most unemployed people could find a job if they really 
wanted one” (1: strongly disagree,…,5: strongly agree) 
 
These questions are about incentives in the bottom part of the income distribution that 
may not necessarily be linked to those at the top.  There are no directly equivalent 
questions about incentives in the top part of the distribution but we do experiment with: 
 
INCENTIVES4 “no-one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they 
expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers” (1: strongly disagree,…, 5: strongly 
agree) 
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INCENTIVES5 “large differences in income are necessary for Britain’s prosperity” (1: 
strongly disagree,…,5: strongly agree) 
 
These two last questions are only asked in a handful of years so cannot be used when 
trying to account for the changing demand for redistribution.   
 
Trust 
The model presented above assumes that the tax/benefit system that maximizes the social 
objective function will be implemented.  But, in reality, citizens rely on their elected 
representatives to implement policies and this principal-agent problem is one in which the 
politicians are only held to account in occasional elections.  In Appendix C we modify 
the model of the earlier section to include, in a stylized manner, an agency cost in which 
the government diverts a certain part of the revenue passing through its hands to its own 
ends that are assumed to be worthless to the general population.  As the model sketches, 
the larger the agency problem the less likely there is to be redistribution because the less 
money that passes through the government’s hands, the less ability there is to divert 
resources to their own ends.  To capture these ideas we use various measures of trust in 
government: 
 
TRUST1 “How much do you trust the British government of any party to place the needs 
of the nation above the interests of their own political party” (4: just about always,…., 1: 
almost never) 
 
TRUST2 “Generally speaking those we elect as MPs lose touch with people pretty 
quickly” (1: strongly disagree,…,5: strongly agree) 
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TRUST3 “Parties are only interested in people’s votes not in their opinions” (1: strongly 
disagree,…,5: strongly agree) 
 
TRUST4 “People like me have no say in what the government does” (1: strongly 
disagree,…,5: strongly agree) 
 
TRUST5 “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me 
cannot really understand what is going on” (1: strongly disagree,…,5: strongly agree) 
 
Another way in which the actual amount of redistribution might differ from the intended 
amount is through incompetence.  To capture these ideas we use the following measures 
of fraud in the welfare system: 
 
FRAUD1 “Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another” (1: strongly 
disagree,…,5: strongly agree) 
 
FRAUD2 “Large number of people these days falsely claims benefits” (1: strongly 
disagree,…,5: strongly agree) 
 
Descriptive statistics of all these variables are reported in Table 2 together with means for 
different time periods to give an idea of trends. 
 
4. Empirical Evidence on the Demand for Redistribution: Pooled Cross-Section 
Results 
We start by reporting results based on pooled cross-sections, and then try to decompose 
changes over time.  Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the demographic variables 
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and the results of an equation for the demand for redistribution that only includes 
demographic variables.   
 The dependent variable is the response to the question “government should 
redistribute income from the better-off to those that are less well-off” and takes the value 
1-5 with higher values representing a greater demand for redistribution.  We simply 
estimate a linear model because this makes the decompositions that follow easier but 
nothing crucial depends on this. 
 In column 2 of Table 3 we see that there is a very strong effect of relative 
equivalised income on the demand for redistribution, a common finding in the literature.  
This suggests that economists’ models of the demand for redistribution as first proposed 
by Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) do contain an element of truth.  
Current income might contain a lot of noise so it is not surprising that we find an 
additional effect of occupation with those in higher level occupations favouring less 
redistribution.  But education, conditional on income and occupation, does not have a 
simple relationship to the demand for redistribution – the demand is highest amongst 
those with a college degree and then those with no qualification8.   
But, unsurprisingly, other factors are also significant.  Women are less in favour 
of redistribution than men, the demand for redistribution rises with age , ethnic minorities 
are more in favour of redistribution than whites, the non-married are more in favour of 
redistribution than the married with the divorced and separated being particularly in 
favour of redistribution (perhaps in line with Edlund and Pande, 2002).  Those with more 
children are less in favour of redistribution.  There are sizeable regional effects with those 
                                                 
8
 This ordering is reversed if one excludes income and occupation but it remains the case that those with a 
degree tend to favour more redistribution than those with lower levels of education  
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in Scotland, Wales, the north of England and greater London being more in favour of 
redistribution. 
 We do not seek to explain all of these correlations – rather we simply use them as 
background for the variables in which we have more interest.  We start by including the 
sets of variables in groups because one has very few observations if all potentially 
relevant variables are included at once.  In the first column of Table 4 we include 
variables related to preferences towards redistribution.  The coefficients on these 
variables have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero. Particularly 
strong are the variables that measure the ‘class conflict’ variables that measure views on 
the fairness of society – those who think big business is bad and who think there is one 
law for the rich and one for the poor are much more likely to be in favour of 
redistribution.  Those who are racially prejudiced and the religious are less in favour of 
redistribution while trade union members are more.  The second column then includes the 
direct measures of the preferences for redistribution.  These variables have the expected 
sign and are significant but the size and significance of the coefficients on the other 
variables is unaffected. 
 The next set of results then include variables designed to measure misperceptions.  
In the third column of Table 4 we include the perceptions about actual pay differentials.  
Individually these are not very significant but one can reject the hypothesis that they are 
jointly equal to zero. The significance of these variables improves if one controls for 
desired pay differentials (suggesting, perhaps in line with the predictions of cognitive 
dissonance that people do not perceive what they do not like) – the results are reported in 
the fourth column.  The fifth column then only retains the pay differentials relating to 
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unskilled workers, chairmen of corporations and ministers.  The coefficients on what pay 
differentials should be correlated with the demand for redistribution in the way one 
would expect.  The results here suggest that, controlling, for preferences on desired pay 
differentials, one is more likely to be in favour of redistribution if one perceives a great 
deal of inequality.  As Hills (2004) has documented, people tend to under-estimate the 
size of pay differentials so this has the potential to explain a weak demand for 
redistribution.  However, to explain a falling demand for redistribution, one would have 
to argue that misperceptions have worsened over time.  The fact that these questions were 
only asked in 1987 and 1999 makes it hard to consider whether this has happened but the 
means reported in Table 2 suggest that perhaps perceptions of inequality at the top have 
risen. 
 Table 5 includes the variables related to incentives.  In the first column all of the 
questions about the incentives associated with the welfare state are included.  Agreeing 
that the welfare state makes people less willing to look after themselves, that the 
unemployed could get a job if they really wanted one, that if welfare benefits weren’t so 
generous they would learn to stand on their own two feet are all associated with 
demanding less redistribution.  As discussed earlier these variables are about the 
incentives effects at the bottom of the distribution not the top, but the second column 
shows that the variables relating to incentives at the top are also correlated with the 
demand for redistribution.  The third column includes all of the incentive variables.  
Unfortunately, the variables relating to incentives at the top are only available for a few 
years so cannot be used in the decomposition reported below. 
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 In Table 6 we include the variables related to trust in government and belief that 
the system operates fairly.  Belief that large numbers of people falsely claim benefits and 
that most people on the dole are fiddling are strongly associated with lower demands for 
redistribution.  The variables related to trust in government are much weaker, generally 
of the ‘wrong’ sign and individually do not appear significant.  But as the third column 
shows, this is partly a collinearity problem – exclusion of some variables makes the 
remaining ones significant though with the opposite sign from that predicted.  However, 
the overall effect remains small. 
 We have included sets of variables one at a time.  But, if one selects the most 
significant variables and includes them in a pooled regression one gets results like those 
presented in Table 7.  The variables that were significant individually remain significant 
– the effects of the class conflict variables are particularly large.  These results suggest 
that the predictions of a simple theory about the variation in the demand for redistribution 
are in line with the empirical evidence.  But, we are more interested in whether we can 
explain the fall in the demand for redistribution using changes in these variables.  Our 
attempt to do that is the subject of the next section. 
 
5. Empirical Evidence on the Demand for Redistribution: Changes Over Time 
Our aim in this section is to try to provide an account of the change in the demand for 
redistribution over time.  Because not all of the relevant questions are asked in each year 
of the BSAS, our approach is limited, to a considerable degree, by the availability of data.  
We take three sample periods, early (1986 and 1987), middle (1994 and 1996) and late 
(2003 and 2004).  The choice of years might appear a little arbitrary but are chosen in 
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part to reflect the availability of data (e.g. the key question on the demand for 
redistribution is not asked in 1995 or the latest available year, 2004).   Our chosen periods 
do reflect a period in the 1980s when the demand for redistribution was low, a period in 
the 1990s when it was at its peak and a period of still lower demand in the 2000s. 
 Our empirical approach is to estimate separate equations for the demand for 
redistribution in each of these periods and then to use Oaxaca decompositions to 
decompose the observed change in the demand for redistribution into a part that is due to 
changing coefficients and a part that is due to changing characteristics.  The latter 
component can then be further decomposed into a part due to each type of variable.  Our 
chosen specification for this exercise includes all the demographics and then the variables 
CLASSCONFLICT1, CLASSCONFLICT2, RACIALPREJUDICE, INCENTIVES2-3 
and FRAUD2.  This choice of variables to include is partly determined by those that were 
especially significant in the results reported in the previous section but also by the 
availability of questions in enough years.  For example, the variables relating to 
government trust are not available in enough years to be useful, but were not generally 
found to be very significant. 
 The estimates of the redistribution equation for the 3 periods are reported in Table 
A1 and the Oaxaca decompositions in Table 8.  We report results when evaluating the 
change in characteristics at both sets of coefficients – though the choice of year for the 
coefficients typically makes little difference.  The first point is that the effect of 
demographics is normally very small and not always in the direction of a falling demand 
for redistribution.  For example, the share of graduates is rising strongly, and graduates 
tend to be more pro-redistribution.   
 31 
 But the other included variables can explain much of both the rise in the demand 
for redistribution from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s and the subsequent fall, though 
the important factors vary from one sub-period to another.  First, let us consider the 
whole period from the mid 1980s to the 2000s.  Here one can explain approximately 75% 
of the fall in the demand for redistribution and it is the variables related to incentives that 
are most important in that.  Changing preferences and declining trust in the system are 
much less important. 
 But, the decomposition for the 2 sub-samples is a bit different.  In the first sub-
period, from 1986/7 to 1994/6 there is a rise in the demand for redistribution with 
something like two-thirds being explainable.  The most important factor here were the 
changes in the ‘class conflict’ variables – there was, for example, little change in attitudes 
about incentives.  This change is perhaps not surprising given the large rise in pre-tax 
income inequality in this period.  But in the second sub-period, from 1994/6 to 2003/4 
things are very different.  There is now a very large collapse in the demand for 
redistribution with, again, something like two-thirds being explainable.  Now, it is the 
attitudes about incentives that are changing the most but the class conflict variables move 
in the direction of reducing the demand for redistribution, ending up, more or less, where 
they had been in the 1980s.  This change in attitudes is perhaps remarkable because, 
although attitudes ended up in a similar place, income inequality did not – it was much 
higher in 2003/4 than in 1986/7.  But, considering the period as a whole it appears that 
this rise in income inequality has not made people more hostile to the rich and their belief 
in the power of incentives has increased.    
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 There is one other issue that deserves some discussion.  One of the demographic 
variables included in these regressions is age.  Others have argued that cohort effects are 
important that, for example, those who came of age in the Thatcher era have very 
different preferences from the hippies of the sixties generation (see, for example, 
Bromley, 2003).  There is a well-known insurmountable collinearity problem that year of 
birth=year-age so one cannot hope to separately disentangle age from cohort and time 
effects.  Perhaps more worryingly for the investigation here, the way in which one 
chooses to model the demand for redistribution will affect the Oaxaca decomposition.  To 
see this, consider the following simple example.  Suppose there are no cohort effects, 
only age effects and the relationship between the demand for redistribution and age is 
linear and stable over time.  Represent it by: 
 0 1it it ity aβ β ε= + +  (14) 
Then all of any observed change in redistribution can only be due to changes in the age 
distribution – the Oaxaca decomposition will tell us the contribution of changing 
coefficients is zero.  But, now suppose we model the demand for redistribution as a 
function of year of birth, itb .  (14) now becomes:  
 ( )0 1 1it it ity t bβ β β ε= + − +  (15) 
The average year of birth must be increasing over time so that the intercept in the 
redistribution equation will appear to be changing.  The Oaxaca decomposition will give 
a different answer about the contribution of characteristics and coefficients to the 
changing demand for redistribution. 
 There is no solution to this problem as one can never separately identify age and 
cohort and year effects.  But we do not believe it a serious problem.  We have done our 
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decomposition with year of birth instead of age in the demographic variables and our 
results are very similar.  The reason for this is that views on redistribution are not 
strongly correlated with age (see Alt, Preston and Sibieta, 2007, for a similar conclusion). 
Our findings suggest that it is the changing views about the workings of the 
economy, both in terms of the importance of incentives and the justness of the pre-tax 
distribution of resources (as measured by the class conflict variables), that can explain the 
fall in the demand for redistribution.  Of course, one should not think of this as a deep 
causal explanation – these preferences should themselves be seen as endogenous and it is 
an impossible task to track changes in attitudes back to some clearly exogenous 
fundamentals.  Because of this problem, the next section sketches some ways in which 
these preferences might be endogenous. 
 
6. The Endogeneity of Preferences and Beliefs 
In this paper we have shown how, over the past 25 years, pre-tax income inequality has 
risen and the demand for redistribution has fallen.  These changes might be independent 
of each other but there is also the possibility that they are connected.  Such connections 
might run in both directions.  For example, Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Alesina and 
Angeletos (2004) have constructed ingenious models in which the level of inequality 
influences beliefs.  These models can have multiple equilibria in which inequality and 
redistribution are negatively correlated.  Alternatively, it may be that a rise in inequality 
puts the rich at more risk of redistribution while giving them more resources to fight it.  
Hence it may be that the rise in inequality caused the rich to invest more in moulding the 
attitudes of voters in ways that are more tolerant of inequality. 
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 But it is also possible that the causality runs from beliefs to pre-tax income 
inequality.  This might be because pre-tax inequality is influenced by some aspects of 
government policy e.g. the minimum wage or high-quality publicly funded education 
though these are not the factors most often mentioned in accounts of the evolution of UK 
wage inequality.  But it might also be because the decline of class conflictual attitudes 
and the rising belief in the importance of incentives leads to rising relative pay for 
managers within firms i.e. to widening pre-tax income inequality. 
 There is no way that we can hope to disentangle these interconnections and decide 
which are the important ones with the data available to us.  But our data does suggest that 
preferences and attitudes can change quite markedly over short periods of time so that 
models that always treat these fundamentals as changing rather slowly may be rather 
inaccurate and that a very important part of politics may be the battle for the hearts and 
minds of voters. 
   
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown how the rise in pre-tax income inequality in the UK has not 
led to more redistribution.  The main reason for this would appear to be that the demand 
for redistribution is falling and is currently at its lowest recorded level.  We have shown 
that theories of the demand for redistribution do have explanatory power – e.g. the rich 
are less in favour of redistribution, and those who believe incentives are important favour 
less redistribution.  Furthermore these attitudes can change quite rapidly over time.  
Using decomposition, we have argued that the main change in attitudes that can account 
for the falling demand for redistribution in the UK is a greater belief in the importance of 
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incentives as proxied by attitudes about the disincentives to work associated with the 
welfare state.  Quite why attitudes have changed in this way is an interesting question and 
could, conceivably be linked with the rise in wage inequality, but we are not able to offer 
an answer to this question. 
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Table 1: The correlation between measures of the demand for redistribution 
 
REDISTRIBUTE Mean Value of 
Redistribution scale 
Number of observations 
(Total number 3313) 
1 7.98 274 
2 6.73 918 
3 5.28 664 
4                    3.7 982 
5 2.37 475 
 
Notes: REDISTRIBUTE stands for the statement “government should redistribute from the better-off to 
those that are less well-off”, with answers from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to “strongly disagree” and 5 to 
“strongly agree”. Redistribution scale runs from 1 to 11 with 1 corresponding to the view that “the 
government should make much greater efforts to make people’s incomes equal” and 11 to the view that 
“the government should be much less concerned about how equal people’s incomes are”.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Attitudinal Variables 
Variables Average-
1980s 
Average-
1990s 
Average-
2000s 
Average-
All Years 
REDISTRIBUTE: Government should redistribute 
income from better-off to those that are less well-off 
3.2 3.24 3.08 3.2 
CLASSCONFLICT1: Big business benefit owners at 
the expense of workers 
3.37 3.51 3.5 3.48 
CLASSCONFLICT2: There is one law for the rich 
and one for the poor 
3.63 3.75 3.6 3.68 
RACIALPREJUDICE 1.4 1.34 1.3 1.36 
PREFERENCES1: Gap between rich and poor 0.79 0.84 0.81 0.81 
PREFERENCES2: Ordinary working people do not 
get their fair share over the nation’s wealth 
3.61 3.67 3.6 3.63 
NORELIGION 0.32 0.38 0.42 0.38 
TRADE UNION MEMBER 0.25 0.19 0.18         0.2 
ACTPAYDIFF1. Log of actual pay of unskilled 
worker relative to skilled worker 
     -0.48 -0.41 n/a -0.45 
ACTPAYDIFF2 Log of actual pay of chairman of 
big corporation worker relative to skilled worker 
1.89 2.24 n/a 2.03 
ACTPAYDIFF3. Log of actual pay of a doctor 
relative to skilled worker 
0.73 0.88 n/a 0.79 
ACTPATDIFF4. Log of actual pay of cabinet 
minister relative to skilled worker 
1.24 1.42 n/a 1.31 
SHDPAYDIFF1. Log of preferable pay of unskilled 
worker relative to skilled worker 
-0.41 -0.36 n/a -0.39 
SHDPAYDIFF2. Log of preferable pay of chairman 
of big corporation relative to skilled worker 
1.22 1.4 n/a 1.29 
SHDPAYDIFF3. Log of preferable pay of doctor 
relative to skilled worker 
0.67 0.77 n/a 0.68 
SHDPAYDIFF4. Log of preferable pay of cabinet 
minister relative to skilled worker 
0.8 0.91 n/a 0.84 
INCENTIVES1: Welfare state makes people less 
willing to look after themselves 
3.06 3.19 3.34 3.16 
INCENTIVES2: If benefits weren’t so generous 
people would learn to stand on their own feet 
2.9 2.84 3.15 2.95 
INCENTIVES3: Unemployed people could find a 
job if want to 
2.71 2.86 3.63 3.05 
INCENTIVES4: No-one would study to become a 
lawyer or doctor unless they expect to earn a lot 
more than ordinary workers 
3.71 3.61 3.61 3.64 
INCENTIVES5: Large differences in income are 
necessary for Britain’s prosperity 
2.75 2.55 2.78 2.72 
TRUST1: How much trust gov to place nation’s 
needs above that of their own party 
2.38 2.14 1.95 2.13 
TRUST2: MPs lose touch with people quickly 3.72 3.82 3.85 3.82 
TRUST3: Parties are interested in people’s votes not 
their opinions 
3.5 3.72 3.86 3.73 
TRUST4: People like me have no say in what gov 
does 
3.46 3.46 3.6 3.52 
TRUST5: Gov and politics are so complicated 3.61 3.47 3.47 3.48 
FRAUD1: People on the dole fiddle 2.92 3.01 3.16 3.05 
FRAUD2: Many people falsely claim benefits 4.05 4.27 4.34 4.23 
 
Notes: Higher values are associated with (stronger) support of relevant statements/questions. In particular, 
RACIALPREJUDICE is coded as 1: no prejudiced, 3: very prejudiced, PREFERENCES1 as 1: too large, 0: 
about right/too small and TRUST1 as 1: almost never, 4: just about always. NORELIGION and TRADE 
UNION MEMBER are binary coded as 1 if yes and 0 if no. All other variables except ACTPAYDIFF1-4 
and SHDPAYDIFF1-4 are coded as 1: strongly disagree, 5: strongly agree.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Demographic variables and Results from a 
regression of REDISTRIBUTE on demographics 
 
Demographic Variables Mean Regression results 
Log relative household income  0.029 
(0.67) 
                   -0.300 
                   (0.012)** 
Intermediate non manual                     0.17 
(0.37) 
                     0.184 
                    (0.020)** 
Junior non manual 0.19 
 (0.39) 
                     0.142 
                    (0.020)** 
Skilled manual 0.19 
(0.39) 
                     0.266 
                    (0.020)** 
Semi-skilled manual 0.17 
(0.37) 
                     0.316 
                    (0.022)** 
Unskilled manual 0.05 
  (0.023) 
                     0.392 
                    (0.030)** 
Other occupation 0.002 
(0.047) 
                    -0.307 
                    (0.122)* 
Degree 0.12 
(0.33) 
                     0.250 
                    (0.024)** 
Higher education below degree 0.14 
(0.35) 
                    -0.137 
                    (0.021)** 
A levels or equivalent 0.11 
(0.32) 
                    -0.173 
                    (0.022)** 
O levels or equivalent 0.19 
(0.39) 
                    -0.172 
                    (0.019)** 
CSE or equivalent 0.09 
(0.29) 
                    -0.106 
                    (0.022)** 
Foreign/other qualification  0.01 
(0.1) 
                    -0.120 
                    (0.054)* 
Employed 0.56 
(0.49) 
                     0.012 
                    (0.029) 
Other status 0.39 
(0.48) 
                    -0.017 
                    (0.030) 
Male 0.45 
(0.49) 
                     0.139 
                    (0.013)** 
Age 47.6 
  (17.03) 
                     0.015 
                    (0.002)** 
Age2  2562.63 
(1746.1) 
                    -0.0001 
                    (0.00002)** 
Black   0.014 
(0.11) 
                     0.112 
                    (0.049)* 
Asian   0.016 
(0.12) 
                     0.173 
                    (0.046)** 
Mixed/other race  0.007 
(0.08) 
                     0.131 
                    (0.069) 
Living as married   0.067 
(0.25) 
                     0.102 
                    (0.025)** 
Separated 0.11 
(0.31) 
                     0.234 
                    (0.019)** 
Widowed 0.1 
(0.3) 
                     0.181 
                    (0.023)** 
Single 0.16 
(0.37) 
                     0.201 
                    (0.019)** 
No. of children 0.09 
(0.2) 
                    -0.036 
                    (0.007)** 
Scotland   0.064 
(0.24) 
                     0.248 
                    (0.023)** 
North East England    0.099 
(0.2) 
                     0.158 
                    (0.027)** 
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North West England   0.064 
(0.24) 
                     0.161 
                    (0.023)** 
York & Humber 0.09 
(0.28) 
                     0.111 
                    (0.023) 
West Midlands  0.092 
(0.28) 
                     0.085 
                    (0.023)** 
East Midlands                     0.077 
                   (0.26) 
                     0.039 
                    (0.025) 
Eastern England                     0.045 
                   (0.2) 
                     0.057 
                    (0.030) 
South West England                     0.09 
                   (0.29) 
                     0.078 
                    (0.023)** 
London                     0.098 
                   (0.29) 
                     0.141 
                    (0.023)** 
Wales                     0.05 
                   (0.22) 
                     0.185 
                    (0.029)** 
Year dummies   Yes 
No. of observations  34341 34341 
R2   0.09 
 
The dependent variable in the regression reported in the second column is the REDISTRIBUTE variable.  
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level  
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Table 4: Regressions explaining redistribution with preferences and perceptions 
variables  
The dependent variable in the regression reported in the second column is the REDISTRIBUTE variable.  
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level  
Independent 
Variables 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4)   (5) 
Preferences 
     
Big business benefits 
owners at the expense of 
workers 
0.389 
(0.008)** 
0.248       
(0.012)** 
 
  
One law for rich and one 
for poor 
0.248 
(0.008)** 
0.141                   
(0.011)** 
 
  
Union member  0.051 
(0.018)** 
 0.045     
(0.023)* 
 
  
Racial prejudiced -0.140        
(0.013)** 
 
-0.131        
(0.016)** 
 
  
No religion   0.052 
(0.015)** 
 0.052      
(0.019)** 
 
  
Gap between rich and 
poor too large 
  0.225     
(0.024)** 
 
  
Ordinary working people 
do not get their fair share 
over the nation’s wealth 
  0.317     
(0.013)** 
 
  
Misperceptions      
Log of actual pay of 
unskilled worker relative 
to skilled worker 
  
 -0.144 
 (0.105)  
 
-0.630 
(0.124)** 
-0.62 
(0.11)** 
 
Log of actual pay of 
chairman of big 
corporation worker 
relative to skilled worker 
  
 -0.007     
 (0.039)  
 
 0.173 
(0.046)** 
  
 0.18 
 0.04)** 
 
 Log of actual pay of a 
doctor relative to skilled 
worker 
  
 -0.080     
 (0.081)  
 
 0.046 
(0.106)  
 
 
 Log of actual pay of 
cabinet minister relative 
to skilled worker 
  
  0.149     
(0.054)** 
 
 0.171 
(0.062)** 
  
 
0.20 
(0.05)** 
 
Log of desired pay of 
unskilled worker relative 
to skilled worker 
   
 0.808                 
(0.126)** 
 
 0.77 
(0.10)** 
 
 
Log of desired pay of 
chairman of big 
corporation relative to 
skilled worker 
   
-0.353            
(0.056)** 
-0.42 
(0.05)** 
Log of desired pay of 
doctor relative to skilled 
worker 
   
-0.122            
(0.107) 
 
Log of desired pay of 
cabinet minister relative 
to skilled worker 
   
-0.090            
(0.068)  
 
-0.11 
(0.06) 
 
 
     
Demographic variables    Yes   yes  yes    yes    Yes 
Year dummies   Yes   yes  yes    yes    Yes 
No. of observations 19046 10606 1448  1386   1409 
R2 0.32 0.38 0.10   0.17    0.17 
 41 
Table 5: Regressions explaining redistribution with incentive variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable in the regression reported in the second column is the REDISTRIBUTE variable.  
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level  
Independent 
Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Incentives 
   
Welfare state makes 
people less willing to 
look after themselves 
- 0.091                                
(0.009)** 
 
 -0.044 
(0.049) 
 
 
If benefits weren’t so 
generous people would 
learn to stand on their 
own feet  
 -0.095 
(0.009)** 
 
 
 -0.131 
(0.052)** 
 
 
Unemployed people 
could find a job if want 
to 
 -0.077           
(0.009)** 
 
  -0.021 
(0.051) 
 
 
Large differences in 
income are necessary 
for Britain’s prosperity 
 -0.238      
(0.020)**
           
 
 -0.254 
(0.044)** 
 
No one would study for 
years to become a 
lawyer or doctor unless 
they expected to earn a 
lot more than ordinary 
workers 
 
0.067   
(0.020)**
           
 
-0.055 
(0.044) 
 
 
    
Demographic variables   yes    yes     yes 
Year dummies   yes    yes     yes 
No. of observations  18809   3012    654 
R2   0.12   0.12    0.17 
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Table 6: Regressions explaining redistribution with trust and fraud variables 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Trust 
   
How much 
trust gov to 
place nation’s 
needs above 
that of their 
own party 
-0.031 
(0.022)   
 
-0.022 
(0.020)  
 
 
MPs lose touch 
with people 
quickly 
0.006 
(0.020)  
0.007 
(0.018)  
 
 
Parties are 
interested in 
people’s votes 
not their 
opinions 
0.025 
(0.020)  
 
0.027 
(0.018)  
0.037 
(0.014)** 
 
 
People like me 
have no say in 
what gov does 
0.003  
(0.015) 
  
Gov and 
politics are so 
complicated 
0.009  
(0.015) 
  
Fraud    
People on the 
dole fiddle 
 -0.104 
(0.015)** 
  
 
 -0.088 
(0.014)** 
 -0.084 
(0.014)** 
 
Many people 
falsely claim 
benefits 
 -0.14  
(0.017)** 
  
- 0.141 
(0.016)** 
 -0.137 
(0.015)** 
 
Demographic 
variables  
  yes    yes    Yes 
Year dummies   yes    yes    Yes 
 
   
No. of 
observations 
 5285  6021   6807 
R2  0.10  0.10    0.10 
  
The dependent variable in the regression reported in the second column is the REDISTRIBUTE variable.    
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level  
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Table 7: Pooled regressions explaining redistribution with selected variables 
 
The dependent variable in the regression reported in the second column is the REDISTRIBUTE variable.     
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level  
 
 
Independent Variables     (1)      (2) 
Preferences 
  
Big business benefit owners at the expense of workers 0.429 
(0.020)** 
 
0.423 
(0.014)** 
 
One law for rich and one for poor 0.217 
(0.019)** 
 
0.231 
(0.014)** 
 
 
Union member  0.018 
(0.043) 
 
Racial prejudiced -0.125 
(0.034)** 
 
-0.096 
(0.023)** 
No religion   0.025  
(0.036) 
 
Incentives   
Welfare state makes people less willing to look after 
themselves 
-0.064 
(0.019)** 
 
-0.065 
(0.014)** 
 
If benefits weren’t so generous people would learn to stand 
on their own feet  
-0.039 
(0.021) 
 
-0.041 
(0.014)* 
 
Unemployed people could find a job if want to -0.053 
(0.020)** 
-0.059 
(0.014)** 
 
Trust   
Parties are interested in people’s votes not their opinions -0.016 
(0.018) 
 
Fraud   
People on the dole fiddle -0.036 
(0.021) 
 
Many people falsely claim benefits -0.048 
(0.018)*  
 
-0.055 
(0.013)** 
 
 
 
  
Demographic variables      Yes     Yes 
Year dummies     Yes     Yes 
 
  
No. of observations  3047   5802 
R2  0.34   0.36 
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Table 8: Oaxaca decomposition of changes in the demand for redistribution over 
time 
 
Notes: Contribution of individual demographic variables not reported in the interests of space.  These 
details are available from the authors on request. 
 1986/87-2003/04 1986/87-1994/96 1994/96-2003/04 
 
1986/87 
estimated 
coefficients 
2003/04 
estimated 
coefficients 
1986/87 
estimated 
coefficients 
1994/96 
estimated 
coefficients 
1994/96 
estimated 
coefficients 
2003/04 
estimated 
coefficients 
Total Difference -0.166 -0.166 0.156 0.156 -0.323 -0.323 
Unexplained -0.054 -0.043 0.065 0.041 -0.143 -0.11 
Explained 
-0.112 -0.123 0.091 0.115 -0.18 -0.213 
Contributions in 
explained difference 
      
Demographics -0.013 0.016 -0.018 -0.011 0.029 0.022 
Preferences -0.005 -0.0001 0.105 0.125 -0.11 -0.093 
Big business benefit 
owners at the expense of 
workers 
0.033 0.028 0.087 0.108 -0.066 -0.044 
One law for rich and one 
for poor  -0.05 -0.046 0.012 0.01 -0.052 -0.057 
Racial prejudiced 0.011 0.017 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.009 
Incentives -0.079 -0.108 0.008 0.007 -0.083 -0.12 
If benefits weren’t so 
generous people would 
learn to stand on their 
own feet  
-0.034 -0.06 0.004 0.001 -0.017 -0.068 
Unemployed people 
could find a job if want 
to 
-0.045 -0.047 0.004 0.005 -0.066 -0.052 
Fraud -0.013 -0.03 -0.003 -0.005 -0.014 -0.022 
Many people falsely 
claim benefits -0.013 -0.03 -0.003 -0.005 -0.014 -0.022 
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Figure 1 
The Shares of Original Income by Cumulative Quintile 
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Source: ONS data in Jones (2006) and equivalent for earlier years. 
 
Figure 2 
The Shares of Final Income by Cumulative Quintile 
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Source: ONS data in Jones (2006) and equivalent for earlier years. 
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Figure 3 
The Relationship Between Shares of Final Income and the Incentive Term 
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Notes: These are computed using the formula in (10) and using the methods described in 
Appendix B. 
 
Figure 4  
The Changing Demand for Redistribution 
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Notes: this is the mean value of REDISTRIBUTE (“government should redistribute 
income from the better-off to those that are less well-off”) 
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Figure 5 
The Changing Demand for Redistribution  
by quartile of equivalised household income 
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Notes: this is the mean value of REDISTRIBUTE (“government should redistribute 
income from the better-off to those that are less well-off”) 
 
Figure 6 
The Changing Demand for Redistribution among Voters and Non-Voters 
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Notes: this is the mean value of REDISTRIBUTE (“government should redistribute income from the better-
off to those that are less well-off”) for those who reported voting in the previous general election and those 
who did not.
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Table A1: Regression results for early, middle and late sample periods 
  
Independent Variables 1986-87 1994-96 2003-2004 
Demographics    
Log relative household income -0.119 -0.140 -0.168 
 (0.078) (0.047)** (0.049)** 
Intermediate non manual -0.015  0.032 -0.062 
 (0.119) (0.076) (0.079) 
Junior non manual -0.017  0.100 -0.111 
 (0.118) (0.075) (0.093) 
Skilled manual -0.026  0.092 -0.049 
 (0.114) (0.077) (0.089) 
Semi-skilled manual  0.153  0.165 -0.100 
 (0.126) (0.083)* (0.097) 
Unskilled manual  0.115  0.137 -0.125 
 (0.173) (0.108) (0.147) 
Other occupation -0.135 -0.003 -0.868 
 (0.416) (0.439) (0.652) 
Degree  0.215  0.114 -0.000 
 (0.152) (0.097) (0.100) 
Higher education below degree -0.050  0.062 -0.097 
 (0.117) (0.082) (0.096) 
A levels or equivalent -0.114 -0.036 -0.129 
 (0.128) (0.084) (0.094) 
O levels or equivalent -0.178 -0.000 -0.017 
 (0.099) (0.072) (0.081) 
CSE or equivalent -0.037  0.063 -0.007 
 (0.122) (0.095) (0.092) 
Foreign/other qualification -0.435 -0.174 -0.087 
 (0.382) (0.224) (0.231) 
Employed -0.023  0.182  0.148 
 (0.174) (0.105) (0.153) 
Other status -0.035  0.118  0.101 
 (0.180) (0.106) (0.154) 
Male  0.050  0.052  0.123 
 (0.082) (0.052) (0.056)* 
Age -0.021  0.000 -0.000 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) 
Age2  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Black -0.066  0.598  0.087 
 (0.506) (0.169)** (0.215) 
Asian  0.085 -0.120  0.211 
 (0.338) (0.172) (0.188) 
Mixed/other race -1.976  0.108  0.397 
 (1.005)* (0.237) (0.280) 
Living as married -0.238  0.107  0.118 
 (0.195) (0.099) (0.098) 
Separated  0.068  0.121  0.095 
 (0.141) (0.071) (0.074) 
Widowed  0.044  0.025 -0.069 
 (0.151) (0.093) (0.101) 
Single  0.055  0.054  0.109 
 (0.128) (0.077) (0.080) 
No. of children -0.026  0.000  0.007 
 (0.041) (0.028) (0.032) 
Scotland  0.147  0.096  0.034 
 (0.131) (0.093) (0.095) 
North East England  0.085  0.178 -0.119 
 (0.152) (0.104) (0.121) 
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North West England  0.087  0.068  0.174 
 (0.129) (0.085) (0.101) 
York & Humber  0.072  0.141 -0.027 
 (0.130) (0.094) (0.099) 
West Midlands  0.056 -0.065  0.061 
 (0.137) (0.087) (0.099) 
East Midlands  0.063  0.022  0.049 
 (0.137) (0.094) (0.100) 
Eastern England -0.217 -0.146 -0.106 
 (0.169) (0.120) (0.130) 
South West England  0.050  0.040 -0.024 
 (0.132) (0.084) (0.102) 
London  0.187  0.038  0.041 
 (0.139) (0.086) (0.103) 
Wales -0.186  0.115  0.092 
 (0.161) (0.120) (0.123) 
Preferences    
Big business benefit owners at the 
expense of workers 
 0.388 
(0.036)** 
 0.483 
(0.027)** 
 0.326 
(0.032)** 
One law for rich and one for poor  0.255  0.210  0.231 
 (0.036)** (0.025)** (0.030)** 
Racial prejudiced  -0.079  -0.106 - 0.124 
  (0.057)  (0.043)*  (0.049)* 
Incentives    
Unemployed people could find a job if 
want to 
- 0.060 
 (0.035) 
 -0.082 
 (0.025)** 
- 0.064 
 (0.032)* 
If benefits weren’t so generous people 
would learn to stand on their own feet  
 -0.077 
 (0.034)* 
 -0.033 
 (0.026) 
 -0.134 
 (0.029)** 
Fraud    
Many people falsely claim benefits - 0.034  -0.053  -0.080 
  (0.032)  (0.024)*  (0.031)** 
Observations   980   1523   1378 
R-squared   0.37   0.39   0.29 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level    
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Using (6) one can write (7) as:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1) ' (1) ' ( )g f U f df U G f U f df U G f w f V f dfΩ = = − = −     (16) 
Now, ( )1U  can be thought of as being determined by the budget constraint that: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )C f df W f H f df Y= =   (17) 
Using (1) and (6) this budget constraint can be written as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
'1 f
w x V x dx H fU
e e e df Yθ− =  (18) 
Or, taking logs: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
'
1 log log f
w x V x dx H fU W f H f df e e dfθ−= −   (19) 
Putting this into (16) gives an expression for the objective function that is written solely 
in terms of V(f) (or H(f) which is a function of V(f)).  Taking the derivative with respect 
to V(f) leads to the first-order condition:  
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )01 ' ' '
f
C x dxW f H f H f H f C f
H f w f G f w f
V f Y H f V f V f Y Yθ
∂ ∂∂Ω
= − + −
∂ ∂ ∂

  (20) 
Using (4) this can be simplified to the following:  
 ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )'
Y
C C
s f
V f s f w f S f G f
V f V fε
 ∂Ω
= − + −    ∂  
  (21) 
Where ( )( )V fε  is the elasticity of labour supply with respect to ( )V f , ( )Ys f  is the 
‘share’ of an individual at position f in total income, ( )Cs f  is the ‘share’ of an individual 
at position f in total post-tax income (i.e. consumption), and ( )CS f  is the cumulative 
share of individuals up to position f in total consumption.  This, in turn, can be further 
simplified by noting that ( ) ( )/C Ys f s f  is 1 minus the average tax rate so that (21) can 
be written as:  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' '1C C
m f
V f S f w f S f G f
V f m fε
 ∂Ω
= + −    ∂ − 
  (22) 
Where ( )m f  is the marginal tax rate faced by a person at position f in the income 
distribution and we have used the fact that V(f) is 1 minus the marginal tax rate divided 
by 1 minus the average tax rate.  Re-arranging and assuming an interior solution proves 
the result. 
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Appendix B: Estimating the Preference Equation 
 
Our main focus of interest will be on the top deciles.  A good approximation to the 
cumulative shares of both pre- and post-tax income in this data is the following: 
 ( ) ( )log 1 , ,i iS f f i Y Cα= − − =  (23) 
This is equivalent to the approximation of an exponential distribution with a higher value 
of α  corresponding to more inequality at the top.  If we estimate this equation for the top 
5 deciles for each year from 1971-2005 the R2 is never below 0.99 so this is a good 
approximation.  The estimated values are plotted in Figure XX.  For pre-tax inequality 
one sees a rise from the early 1970s to the early 1990s since when there is not much 
change although a hint of a downward trend.  For post-tax income the 1970s were a 
period in which post-tax inequality did not change much but there was then a sharp rise in 
the 1980s but since the 1990s there has not been much of a change. 
From (23) we have that:  
 ( ) ( )'C C CS f S fα=  (24) 
Now we will also have that the 1 minus the marginal rate of taxation will be given by: 
 ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
2
2
''
1
''
C CC
Y Y Y
S f S f
m f
S f S f
α
α
− = =  (25) 
This also implies that the coefficient of residual income progression will be given by:  
 ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
'' '
'
'' '
C Y C
Y C Y
S f S f
V f
S f S f
α
α
= =     (26) 
So is constant.  This then implies, from (5) that hours of work will be constant in this part 
of the distribution so that: 
 ( ) ( )( )
''
'
'
Y
Y
Y
S f
w f
S f α= =     (27) 
If we put this information into (10) we have that:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 12 2
1 1
12
Y C
C C
C
f f
f f Y C
C f
Y C
e eG f e e
e
α α
α α
α
α αε
α
α α
− − − −
− − − −
− −
 
−
= −  
 
  (28) 
Because everything on the right-hand side of (28) is observable part from the 
labour supply elasticity one can use (28) to derive  
One can re-arrange this to give:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 12 2
1 1
12
1 Y CC C
C
f f
f f Y C
C f
Y C
e e
e G f e
e
α α
α α
α
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− − − −
− − − −
− −
 
−
= +  
 
  (29) 
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Appendix C 
A Model of the Tax System with an Agency Cost 
 
In this section we sketch how the presence of an agency cost will tend to reduce tax rates.  
We do not construct an elaborate model of the principal-agent relationship between 
citizen and elected representative.  Rather we assume that a fraction of total tax revenue 
that passes through the government’s hands on the way from one set of citizens to another 
is ‘lost’ which can be thought of as either through incompetence or venality with the 
social value of the recipients of this in the latter case being assumed to be zero.  If the 
position in the income distribution where is denoted by f* then the budget constraint (8) 
for the government becomes: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* 1
0 *
1
f
f
C f W f H f df W f H f C f dfγ− = − −         (30) 
which can be re-arranged to give:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* 1 * 1
0 * 0 *
1 1
f f
f f
C C f df C f df W f H f df W f H f df Yγ γ= + − = + − =    
 (31) 
Using (1) and (6) this budget constraint can be written as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
* 1
0 *
' '* 1
0 *
1 log 1
log 1 log * 1 1 *f f
f
f
w x V x dx w x V x dxf H f H f
f
U W f H f df W f H f df
e e df e e df f fθ θ
γ
γ γ
− −
 
= + −
  
  
− + − − + − −    
 
 
 
 (32) 
Putting this into (16) gives an expression for the objective function that is written solely 
in terms of V (f) (or H (f) which is a function of V (f)).  Taking the derivative with 
respect to V (f) leads to the first-order condition for someone in the top part of the income 
distribution i.e. for whom f>f* leads to:  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
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  (33) 
Using (4) this can be simplified to the following:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*1 . ' 1Y C C C
s fC Y CV f s f w f S f S f G f
V f V f CC Cγ ε γ γ
 ∂Ω   = − − + − + −    ∂    
  (34) 
Where the notation is the same as before and ( )*CS f  is the cumulative share of 
individuals up to position f* in total consumption.  This, in turn, can be further simplified 
by noting that ( ) ( )/C Ys f s f  is 1 minus the average tax rate so that (21) can be written 
as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*1 ' ' 1
1C C C
m fC CV f S f w f S f S f G f
V f m fC Cγ ε γ γ
 ∂Ω   = − + − + −    ∂ −    
  (35) 
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Where ( )m f  is the marginal tax rate faced by a person at position f in the income 
distribution.  Now using (31) we also have that: 
( ) ( )*1 CC S fC γ γ= − +

  (36) 
Substituting this into (35) and assuming we have an interior solution we have that:  
 
( )
( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* 1
' 1
1 '
C C
C
G f S f S f G f
m f w f
m f S fV f
γ
γ
ε
 
− − −    
− 
= 
− 
  (37) 
The final term is a measure of the agency cost and the larger it is, the lower the optimal 
marginal tax rate.  A comparison with the formula for the optimal tax rate in Proposition 
1 shows an extra negative term on the right-hand side. 
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